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Abstract
The need to rapidly decarbonise energy systems is widely accepted, yet there is growing criticism of ‘top–down’, technocen-
tric transition visions. Transitions are, such critics claim, unpredictable, contested, and comprise of multiple and competing 
perspectives. This paper opens up to diverse visions of energy transitions by studying a corpus of 12 visions produced across 
different ‘institutional settings’ of the state, business, science and technology, and civil society in the UK. We introduce a 
new analytical framework grounded in relational co-productionist perspectives in science and technology studies (STS) to 
comparatively analyse the similarities and differences of the visions in relation to four dimensions of sociotechnical trans-
formation: meanings, knowings, doings, and organisings. Whilst research on energy transitions often focuses on dominant 
imaginaries within political cultures, regimes and centres of power, it is an explicit intention of this paper to also com-
paratively map the distributed, diverse and counter-hegemonic visions. The paper reveals that what is often presented as a 
primarily ‘technical’ transition is always normative in bringing forward particular forms of social and political order. Our 
analysis reveals important distinctions between more ‘centred’ and more decentred or ‘alternative’ imaginaries of the energy 
transition, differences which reveal the inherently political nature of energy futures. Visions which emerge from civil society 
settings are shown to be a key locus of diversity in sociotechnical imaginaries and tend to open up to alternative models of 
progress, social change, and the roles of publics. This emphasises the significant role played by the settings and the make-
up of collective practices through which energy visions are co-produced. We suggest that mapping diverse visions to reveal 
their respective partialities, exclusions and sociopolitical dimensions in this way, can offer a more humble, reflexive, and 
responsible foundation for practices of future-making and sociotechnical transformations.
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Introduction
In recent years, energy has re-emerged as a pressing and 
salient political issue, with growing calls for a purposive 
‘energy transition’ from a range of different actors including 
social movements (Hopkins 2008), governments (HM Gov-
ernment 2009) and a growing academic research community 
focused on accelerating sustainability transitions (Markard 
et al. 2012). Uncertainties relating to the future configuration 
of the energy system, of the appropriate mixture of tech-
nologies, of projected costs, of public ‘acceptability’ of cer-
tain technologies and of ways in which an energy transition 
might contribute towards meeting targets relating to climate 
change have led to calls for more science and research to 
address the perceived knowledge gaps (King et al. 2015). 
To date, a key approach to address these questions has been 
through the elaboration of energy scenarios and associated 
anticipatory techniques that aim to provide insights into dif-
ferent possible energy futures. These futures for the present 
are part of a broader trend to govern present energy systems 
and process of change using future-oriented methodologies 
(Söderholm et al. 2011).
In the case of the UK energy system, much of this work 
has been of a largely technical and quantitative basis, often 
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drawing on computational models which, like other forms 
of model, exert epistemic authority, consequently, shaping 
policy interventions and the allocation of resources (Hulme 
2013). Yet, despite the history of energy being deeply con-
tested and political, many scenarios and visions neglect to 
explore the political dimensions of energy change. A similar 
critique has been levelled at the sustainability transition field 
where research is used to inform policy, but has not suf-
ficiently accounted for issues of power, politics, and direc-
tionality (Shove and Walker 2007; Meadowcroft 2009). In 
other words, questions of ‘whose vision counts?’ are not 
properly considered, nor are considerations of which actors 
are included and excluded from decisions about—and who 
will bear the risks and benefits of—future sustainability tran-
sitions. To address this, it has been argued that more ‘bot-
tom–up’ distributed approaches are needed that can better 
attend to diversities of actors, commitments, and alternative 
visions that are involved in systemic change (Stirling 2011).
This paper provides one such attempt at ‘opening up’ 
the diversities that surround different energy visions, in the 
sense of exposing the different framing conditions, assump-
tions and normativities within the processes of technological 
futures (Stirling 2008). It does this by taking a corpus of 12 
different visions of an energy transition and comparatively 
analysing them in parallel to expose the commonalities and 
diversities in terms of their future-making practices and 
imagined futures. Adopting a relational co-productionist 
perspective (Chilvers and Longhurst 2015, 2016; Chilvers 
and Kearnes 2016), we build on the previous work that 
emphasises the importance of sociotechnical visions (Berk-
hout 2006) and sociotechnical imaginaries (Jasanoff and 
Kim 2009, 2015) in sociotechnical change. To date, such 
work has often focused on dominant or hegemonic imaginar-
ies within political cultures, regimes and centres of power, 
whereas it is an explicit intention of this paper to also map 
some distributed, diverse, and counter-hegemonic visions 
(see also Smith and Tidwell 2016). We argue that attention 
to energy visions is critical for understanding the processes 
of sociotechnical transformations, not least because whether 
intentional or not all visions are performative in the sense 
that they shape and construct actors’ present realities and 
the decisions that they consequently make (Michael 2000).
Our analysis shows how all sociotechnical visions are par-
tial, situated and exclusionary in multiple ways (cf. Chilvers 
and Longhurst 2016). Energy visions are shown to be always 
co-produced in that what is often presented as a primar-
ily ‘technical’ transition is also simultaneously normative 
in assuming and advocating desired states of social and 
political order (Jasanoff 2004). Furthermore, we show how 
competing visions have different implications for the role 
of society and different social actors—not least in terms of 
equity over the distribution of risks and benefits, and issues 
of inclusion and control (Leach et al. 2010; Macnaghten and 
Chilvers 2014). As such, attending to the diversity of visions, 
particularly those that are more radical or peripheral, is one 
way of opening up the politics of energy transitions and 
shedding light on the areas where contention exists. Thus, 
we conclude with a call for more reflexive approaches to 
energy futures’ work, ones that attend to the societal dimen-
sions, politics and potential diversities rather than closing 
down around a specific narrow approach to understand the 
future of energy systems.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next section reviews 
the relevant literature on sociotechnical visions whilst also 
briefly setting out the underlying theoretical approach. The 
third section outlines the methodology employed in the 
paper, followed by a description of the key findings of the 
comparative analysis. Building on this, a discussion draws 
out some key interpretive themes that emerged from the 
analysis. In conclusion, we reflect on the implications of 
our study for anticipatory energy futures and futures research 
more broadly.
Sociotechnical visions and imaginaries
Sociotechnical visions have been defined as “collectively 
held and communicable schemata that represent future 
objectives and express the means by which these objec-
tives will be realised” (Berkhout 2006: 302). Berkhout sug-
gests that visions tend to consist of issues (i.e. some kind 
of problematisation), technologies, and institutions/orders. 
Transition visions can, therefore, be scrutinised both for 
the rationale for the transition and in terms of a specific set 
of governance arrangements and technological configura-
tions that are proposed. Visions can also invoke different 
geographical scales; for example, they may relate to spe-
cific countries (HM Government 2009); regions (Späth and 
Rohracher 2010) or cities (Hodson and Marvin 2009). The 
geographical imaginary is likely to be shaped by the interests 
or priorities of the organisation, individual or collective that 
has produced the vision.
The literature on energy futures commonly makes a dis-
tinction between descriptive and normative futures, where 
the former are more analytical and the latter are explicit 
about the kind of future that they want to produce (e.g. 
McDowall and Eames 2006; Söderholm et al. 2011). In 
contrast, this paper adopts a relational co-productionist per-
spective which suggests that even those visions which are 
seemingly descriptive or exploratory bring forward particu-
lar normativities in the form of imagined social, political 
and economic orders which extend beyond the exposition 
of future energy systems. The idea of a ‘sociotechnical 
imaginary’ captures the way in which technological visions 
can also produce imaginaries of social and political order. 
Jasanoff and Kim (2009: 120) introduce the concept of a 
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sociotechnical imaginary to describe “collectively imagined 
forms of social life and social order reflected in the design 
and fulfilment of nation-specific scientific and/or technologi-
cal projects”. Jasanoff and Kim (2009) contrast the differ-
ent imaginaries that surround the nuclear power in South 
Korea and the United States, highlighting that, in each case, 
the technology was implicated in broader projects relating 
to progress and national identity. Jasanoff and Kim (2015) 
have subsequently refined and broadened their definition to 
acknowledge that imaginaries can be articulated by other 
organised groups including social movements and corpora-
tions. Thus, sociotechnical imaginaries are
“collectively held and performed visions of desirable 
futures” (or of resistance against the undesirable), and 
they are also “animated by shared understandings of 
forms of social life and social order attainable through, 
and supportive of, advances in science and technol-
ogy.” Unlike mere ideas and fashions, sociotechnical 
imaginaries are collective, durable, and capable of 
being performed; yet, they are also temporally situ-
ated and culturally particular. Moreover, as captured by 
the adjective “sociotechnical,” these imaginaries are at 
once products and instruments of the co-production of 
science, technology, and society in modernity (Jasanoff 
2015, 19).
Within this paper, we, therefore, use the concept of soci-
otechnical imaginaries to refer to durable and collectively 
held visions which relate to particular technological pro-
jects, in this case a purposive energy transition. Underpinned 
by Jasanoff’s (2004) idiom of co-production, the concept 
provides the impetus for an analysis of futures which rec-
ognises that technological visions are about more than just 
technologies, that they inevitably bring forward imagined 
social, political, and economic orders, whether or not this is 
their explicit intention.
Building on these insights, we have, in our previous work, 
developed a relational co-productionist approach for under-
standing diverse forms of participation in energy transitions 
(see Chilvers and Longhurst 2015, 2016; Chilvers and Kear-
nes 2016). This approach has taken sociomaterial collectives 
of public participation as its focus, conceptualising how the 
subjects (publics), objects (energy-related technologies and 
issues) and models (formats) of engagement are co-produced 
through the performance of participatory practices. Our 
comparative analysis of diverse forms of participation in 
energy transitions—ranging from government consultations, 
smart technology trials, grassroots community energy and 
activism—has shown how the particular sociomaterial set-
tings and collective practices through which actors engage 
play a powerful role in shaping visions of ‘the energy transi-
tion’ that are contrasting, partial and often conflicting (Chil-
vers and Longhurst 2016). This paper takes this approach 
further by extending our analysis beyond collectives of pub-
lic participation themselves to study the co-production of 
energy transition visions in actor collectives from settings 
across state, science and technology, business and civil soci-
ety that are all engaged in the ongoing low-carbon energy 
transition.
We, therefore, argue that energy visions can themselves 
also be understood as collectives, assembled from a set of 
different sociomaterial elements and actors. Building on 
Jasanoff’s (2004, 6) argument that co-production involves 
the “constant intertwining of the cognitive, material, social, 
and normative”, we suggest that a vision is itself shaped by, 
co-produces and projects a range of meanings, knowings, 
doings, and modes of organising:
• Meanings normative framings of issues and problemati-
sations, around which sociomaterial collectives cohere, 
their boundaries are drawn, and futures are imagined;
• Knowings epistemic orders, cognition and forms of 
knowledge which both shape, and are produced through, 
the performance of sociomaterial collectives;
• Doings forms of material commitment that are produced 
by sociomaterial collectives (through practices, techno-
logical change, and so on);
• Organizings the forms of governing and social organisa-
tion that are reflected in the way which particular socio-
material collectives are configured.
The antecedents, framing conditions, and modes of 
orchestration and enrolment in any given vision can be 
traced, and a relational perspective helps draw attention 
to the ways in which different visions get assembled, the 
choices that get made, and the fact that they could be made 
otherwise. For example, energy visions vary in the extent 
to which they embrace a plurality of voices as inputs or as 
outputs. Some visions reflect the outcome of certain par-
ticipatory processes, whereas others are less democratic in 
their construction. Similarly, whereas some might present 
a coherent narrative, others can be more internally diverse 
and even contradictory. Indeed, there is unlikely to be con-
sensus surrounding any given vision when the wider context 
is considered, if only because of the uneven distribution of 
(perceived) winners and losers (Berkhout 2006).
From a relational perspective, we can begin to understand 
the situated formation of all visions, the extent to which they 
are partial and, yet, the productive effects that they have. Our 
approach conceives of visions as being potentially produc-
tive on all four dimensions of meanings, knowings, doings, 
and organisings. Across any given system, there are multiple 
forms of energy vision produced by actor collectives that are 
purposively engaged in the energy transition. These can be 
explicit visions—encoded in the form of documents or other 
media—or they can be implicit. An important implication 
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of this is that, whilst it is true that visions can be explicitly 
normative, even those that claim to be ‘objective’ are actu-
ally imbued with social, political, and ethical interests and 
exclusions.
Methodology
To explore the diverse visions that exist around the socio-
technical imaginary of a UK energy transition, it was nec-
essary to construct a corpus of relevant but diverse visions. 
Whilst other studies have conducted comparative reviews of 
energy futures, these often tend to be of one particular form 
of vision and from one particular setting [e.g. see Trutnevtye 
et al. (2016) review of UK energy scenarios]. A key purpose 
of our study was to attend to the diversity of visions, in terms 
of form, scope, and setting. A more experimental methodol-
ogy was, thus, adopted to find a suitably broad sample of 
visions. A literature search was undertaken covering a 5-year 
period (2009–2014) following the publication of the UK 
Low-Carbon Transition Plan which was also included in the 
corpus. This rationale was based on the notion that the UK 
Low-Carbon Transition Plan reflected a specific high-profile 
articulation of a transition vision at time when the broader 
concept of ‘transition’ was gaining some kind of purchase 
(Bailey et al. 2010). We were, therefore, interested in explor-
ing the diversity of other visions that emerged during this 
period that were linked in some way to the United Kingdom, 
either directly or implicitly as part of a wider ‘global’ vision 
of energy system transformation.
Each vision was an explicit expression of an energy future 
which was formalised, documented, published, and publi-
cised, and, in some sense, intended to have a material effect 
in terms of shaping the future of the UK energy system. This 
encompasses those visions that are explicitly normative as 
well as those which are presented as descriptive, explora-
tory, or advisory. The sampling strategy was driven by the 
objective of maximising diversity across the four settings 
(state, civil society, business, and science and technology) 
where we would expect to find different framing conditions 
and different actors involved. Within each setting, additional 
criteria were applied to further enhance the diversity of the 
sample in relation to: (a) the geographical scale of the vision 
(local, regional, national, and global); and (b) the type of 
knowledge inputs (e.g. qualitative/quantitative). Using these 
criteria, three examples of a vision produced within each of 
the four settings were selected with an explicit intention of 
selecting a diverse corpus. In brief, these 12 visions were 
the following (see Table 1 for further details of the visions 
selected for analysis):
State
• UK Government—UK Low-Carbon Transition Plan 
(UKTP)
• INTERREG Consortium—An Energy Vision for the 
North Sea Region (NSV)
• Electricity Networks Strategy Group—Our Electricity 
Transmission Network: a vision for 2020 (ENSG)
Business
• World Economic Forum—Energy Vision 2013 (WEF)
• EDF Energy—Energy Futures (EDF)
• Confederation of Business and Industry—The Colour 
of Growth: Maximising the potential of Green Business 
(CBI)
Science and Technology
• Transition Pathways Consortium—Transition Pathways 
to a UK Low Carbon Energy Future (TP)
• UK Energy Research Centre—Energy 2050 (UKERC)
• Deliberating Energy System Transformation in the UK 
(DEST)
Civil Society
• Centre for Alternative Technology—Zero-Carbon Britain 
(ZCB)
• Transition Town Totnes—Totnes Energy Descent Action 
Plan (TEDAP)
• Quaker Peace and Social Witness—Ending Fossil Fuel 
Dependency (QPSW)
Source documents relating to each of the visions were 
subjected to a qualitative textual analysis, which was struc-
tured around a set of pre-defined in vivo codes that were 
informed both by our relational co-productionist approach 
and cognate literature on visions, namely:
(i) meanings, issues, and framings of the energy transition;
(ii) proposals relating to (material) technologies;
(iii) proposed governance arrangements;
(iv) knowledge inputs; and
(v) roles of different actor groups, including civil society 
and publics.
Using these sensitising categories, a further iteration of 
analytic coding was undertaken which was attentive to both 
the diversities within the narratives (Markusson 2013) and 
the extent to which shared ‘elements’ could be discerned 
(Levidow and Papaioannou 2013). In the cases where there 
were multiple scenarios within one vision, the coding took 
account of them all, so the results reflect a composite of the 
multiple visions within that particular source document. This 
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interpretive exercise was primarily focused on the explicit 
presence or absence of different elements or concepts within 
each vision; for example, the inclusion of specific problems, 
technologies, or different modes of governance.
Mapping diversities of energy visions
Figure 1 represents the four dimensions co-produced in 
each vision: meanings, knowings, doings, and organiz-
ings. In each case, the visions were analysed to assess 
which specific, identifiable sociomaterial elements were 
present or absent. For example, climate change was an ele-
ment which featured as a ‘meaning’ across all 12 visions. 
The shading of the four ‘petals’ also indicates whether 
or not that particular dimension of change is explicitly 
included within the vision. For example, some visions, 
such as the CBI Colour of Growth report, do not explicitly 
set out a technological vision. In this case, there is just a 
problematisation (the rationale for why an energy transi-
tion is needed) and a set of policy proposals to maximise 
the potential of green economic growth. At a very basic 
level, this mapping illustrates how different visions—all 
of which deal with significant aspects of the energy tran-
sition—can be diverse and varied in the co-productive 
dimensions and elements which they include and imagine.
Figure 1 shows that the most constrained vision (in 
terms of the total number of elements made explicit across 
the four dimensions) is that of the Quaker Peace and Social 
Witness project. This vision represents an argument for a 
more green and equitable energy system without specify-
ing how it should be achieved. It, therefore, stops short of 
offering any kind of recommendation in terms of techno-
logical or social organisation of the system. The Electric-
ity Strategy Network Group is also a ‘narrow’ vision, but 
in the sense that it is primarily a technical vision. It con-
tains very little explicit statements on the rationale behind 
the vision, nor on the social dimensions.
At the other end of the spectrum are those visions that 
contain a broader range of elements. Not only do these 
contain some details in terms of a proposed sociotechni-
cal configuration of the energy system, but, in some cases, 
they also provide new knowledge about the energy tran-
sition. This is, particularly, the case in the Science and 
Technology setting, where the purpose of the vision is 
often to provide new appraisals of the energy system and 
its possible trajectory. However, even these have their own 
partialities and absences. Each of the four dimensions that 
make up the visions analysed is now discussed in more 
depth.
Meanings: issues motivating the energy transition
By including ‘meanings’ as one of its four dimensions, our 
relational co-productionist approach highlights the signifi-
cance of normativities in systemic change, decentring mate-
rial technologies from their often-dominant role as the pri-
mary driver. Three broad but somewhat overlapping themes 
emerged from the data in relation to the issues or ‘matters of 
concern’ that are being articulated by the visions in our cor-
pus, namely: environmental issues, energy-related, and eco-
nomic. Climate change was the only issue that was invoked 
by all 12 visions as a rationale for an energy transition. For 
example, in the foreword of the UK Transition Plan (UKTP), 
Ed Miliband—then Secretary of State of Energy and Cli-
mate Change—argues that the “new predictions from the 
Met Office and other scientists, the most detailed yet, show 
that the impacts of climate change are not just an issue for 
other countries and future generations, but an urgent issue 
for Britain” (UKTP, unpaginated). Energy security and 
the affordability of energy for consumers are the other two 
issues which feature prominently across multiple settings, 
although notably neither of these issues features prominently 
in the civil society visions. Climate change, energy security, 
and affordability have been described as the energy ‘trilem-
ma’—a three-pronged rationale for the reconfiguration of 
energy systems (Foxon 2013). Table 2 shows that the civil 
society visions in our corpus do not reproduce the energy 
trilemma, and, instead, open up a broader range of issues.
In contrast to the narrative around energy security—
which often relates to the need to secure adequate sup-
plies of fossil fuels—the civil society visions articulate a 
more negative framing of fossil fuels based on notions of 
vulnerability, addiction, and dependence. For example, 
the Transition Town movement—which forms the con-
text for the production of the Totnes EDAP vision—was 
launched on the basis that there is a need to develop more 
resilient localised economies due to an over reliance on 
fossil fuels and the likelihood of ‘Peak Oil’ which will 
lead to increasing energy costs and scarcity (Hopkins 
2008). This problematisation, therefore, emphasises the 
need to reduce the necessity of fossil fuel usage, rather 
than secure adequate supplies. The civil society visions 
also open up a much broader range of problematisations 
relating to the environmental impacts of the fossil fuel 
regime [for example, incorporating issues of ‘planetary 
boundaries’ (ZCB) and biodiversity (TEDAP)]. The civil 
society visions also include ‘other’ issues which fall out-
side the dominant trilemma such as intergenerational 
equity and the political power of energy companies.
In terms of the overall framing conditions of the 
energy transition, the visions which originate from the 
business setting are neither as narrow as those based pri-
marily around the energy trilemma nor as broad as those 
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originating from the civil society. In these visions, per-
haps not surprisingly, there is a focus on the economic 
rationale for an energy transition. For example, the WEF 
report focuses on the future energy demands from emerg-
ing economies and the need to address energy poverty on 
a global scale. The need for an energy transition to sup-
port economic growth is also an explicit rationale of the 
CBI vision. In contrast, the civil society visions provide 
an interesting and diametrically opposite rationale, argu-
ing that the transformation of the energy system is nec-
essary to transition away from a growth-based economy 
which is environmentally and socially harmful. Here, the 
energy transition is part of the process of a shift towards 
‘degrowth’ or steady-state economy (e.g. see Jackson 
2009).
Doings: material technologies
Table  3 shows the summary elements of technological 
change that were contained within the different visions.
All 12 visions in our corpus propose renewable energy 
generation technologies—with offshore wind the most com-
monly proposed technology—but there is a large variation 
in the types and ambitions of the vision for a transition into 
a more renewable-based electricity system. For example, the 
ZCB vision has the broadest range of different renewable 
technologies, but this reflects its function as an appraisal 
of the energy system that illustrates that a 100% renewable 
energy system is technologically feasible (see Table 4). In 
doing so, it proposes a broad repertoire of technologies. A 
clear division in the visions is between the civil society nar-
ratives—which exclude nuclear and fossil fuels from the 
future energy mix, due to the perceived political, economic, 
and environmental effects of these energy sources—and the 
remaining three settings which include them to a greater or 
lesser degree. Visions which include these energy sources 
within their vision tend to argue that they are necessary for 
systemic ‘diversity’ (WEF) or for system balancing and pro-
viding baseload supply due to the intermittency of renew-
able sources. To retain fossil fuels as part of the energy 
mix, whilst also reducing the carbon emissions of the future 
system, these visions also tend to incorporate Carbon Cap-
ture and Storage (CCS) within their proposed repertoire of 
energy technologies.
Some other important commonalities can be discerned 
across the wider corpus. First, narratives emerging from all 
four settings include some kind of smart technology as being 
important to the future energy system, although details vary 
about the exact kind of implementation, and what this might 
actually entail (cf. Hargreaves et al. 2015). This reflects the 
Table 2  Issues articulated by 
low-carbon visions
UKTP ENSG NSV WEF CBI EDF UKERC TP DEST ZCB QPSW EDAP
Climate change ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Other Environmental ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Energy security ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Fossil Fuel dependence ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Energy affordability ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
To support economic
growth ݲ ݲ ݲ
To support degrowth ݲ ݲ ݲ
Other ݲ ݲ ݲ
Table 3  Material technologies 
proposed by competing low-
carbon visions
UKTP ENSG NSV WEF CBI EDF UKERC TP DEST ZCB QPSW EDAP
Renewables ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Fossil fuels ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Nuclear ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Infrastructure ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Smart technologies ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Transport ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Heating ݲ ݲ ݲ
Other ݲ ݲ
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ongoing integration of energy and communication technolo-
gies, leading to increasing numbers of visions of ‘smart-
ness’ around energy production and consumption. Second, 
visions produced in three out of the four settings emphasise 
the importance of infrastructure within the energy transition. 
The attention given to different forms of infrastructure (or 
lack thereof) can be one indicator of the situatedness of the 
different energy visions. For example, the ESNG vision is 
very much focused around developments required to the UK 
electricity infrastructure, particularly in terms of incorporat-
ing greater levels of renewable generation in the north of the 
UK. The attention that the NSV—a consortium of coastal 
municipalities—gives to infrastructure relates to harbour the 
infrastructure to facilitate the growth and maintenance of 
offshore wind. All four settings also include visions which 
refer to changes in the transport system, but in the most part 
such engagements are limited and partial: the significance 
of inter-system connections between energy and transport 
are acknowledged but not fully explored within the details 
of the visions.
Organizings: governance arrangements
The governance arrangements proposed by each vision have 
been coded in our analysis according to three conventional 
categories of policy instruments: regulatory, economic, 
and voluntary (e.g. see Skea et al. 2011). In addition, one 
further category emerged from our inductive analysis of 
the data which we have labelled ‘alternative frames’. This 
relates to two different framing-based interventions that were 
proposed. The first is the way in which the development of 
scenarios or collective visions was itself proposed as a tool 
to stimulate systemic change. The second is related to the 
potential role for new forms of measuring ‘progress’ beyond 
simply measuring gross domestic product (GDP) such as 
quantifying ‘well-being’ or ‘happiness’ (Layard 2005).
Table 5 illustrates the wide diversity of different points 
and mechanisms that are imagined as effective strategies 
for the governance of energy systems. Overall, the most 
prevalent categories are ‘new regulation’, ‘carbon account-
ing and taxation’, and ‘stimulating low-carbon investment’. 
In terms of patterning across the different settings, Table 5 
Table 4  Specific renewable generation technologies contained within visions
 
UKTP ENSG NSV WEF CBI EDF UKERC TP DEST ZCB QPSW EDAP 
Geothermal heat   ݲ       ݲ   
Biomass   ݲ    ݲ ݲ  ݲ  ݲ 
Hydrogen   ݲ ݲ   ݲ ݲ  ݲ   
Biofuels    ݲ   ݲ     ݲ 
Marine       ݲ      
Solar PV   ݲ   ݲ ݲ     ݲ 
Onshore wind   ݲ   ݲ ݲ ݲ    ݲ 
Biogas   ݲ          
tidal   ݲ          
Offshore wind   ݲ ݲ  ݲ ݲ ݲ  ݲ  ݲ 
Energy from waste 
and Biomass          ݲ  ݲ 
Hydro      ݲ ݲ     ݲ 
Marnie renewables      ݲ      ݲ 
Solar hot water            ݲ 
Tidal lagoon            ݲ 
Desert generated 
solar energy            ݲ 
heat pumps            ݲ 
GM Algae    ݲ         
Synthetic biogas          ݲ   
synthetic biofuels          ݲ   
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illustrates that, in general, all three main kinds of govern-
ance instrument are recommended across the four settings. 
However, the business setting visions generally tend to 
include less regulatory proposals and instead favour vari-
ous forms of economic intervention. In contrast, all three 
civil society visions see regulation as a key tool for system 
steering. Science and Technology derived visions appear 
to have more faith in the role of voluntary action, particu-
larly new forms of partnership than, perhaps, some of the 
other settings.
Carbon management emerges as a governance interven-
tion across the 12 visions with several different kinds of 
carbon management techniques proposed across the whole 
corpus. However, one clear distinction can be discerned 
relating to the distributive mechanism. Two of the civil soci-
ety visions propose ration-based systems such as Tradable 
Energy Quotas (TEQS, see Fawcett et al. 2007) and Contrac-
tion and Convergence (Meyer 2000). In contrast, the state 
and academic visions focused on the more established (mar-
ket-based) mechanisms of carbon accounting, trading, and 
Table 5  Governance approaches 
for steering the energy transition UKTP ENSG NSV WEF CBI EDF UKERC TP DEST ZCB QPSW EDAP
REGULATORY ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
New forms of regulation ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Carbon rationing ݲ ݲ
De/re-regulation of
energy ݲ ݲ ݲ
More coherent policy ݲ ݲ
ECONOMIC ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Carbon accounting and
taxation ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Consumer incentives ݲ ݲ
Stimulating low carbon
investment ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Advocacy of market
based solutions ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Energy pricing /
charging ݲ ݲ ݲ
Funding research ݲ ݲ
Green New Deal ݲ ݲ
VOLUNTARY ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Voluntary action by
citizens ݲ ݲ ݲ
Competitions to engage
public ݲ
New forms of partnership ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Information and
education ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
ALTERNATIVE
FRAMES ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Alternative metrics and
measurements ݲ ݲ ݲ
Further visioning of
futures ݲ ݲ ݲ
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budgeting: for example, the continuation and expansion of 
the existing EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EUETS). These 
reflect very different allocative logics which relate to broader 
philosophies about how resources should be managed.
Knowings: energy knowledges
Table 6 illustrates how different forms of knowledge are 
entangled in visions of the energy transition. First, where 
these are clearly defined, it shows the knowledge inputs 
which went into constructing the visions. Second, it shows 
the forms of knowledge that the visions produce. In some 
cases, but not all, energy visions are explicitly intended 
to produce novel knowledge about (aspects of) the energy 
transition, what Smith and Stirling (2007) call forms of 
‘appraisal’. This is most obvious in the Science and Tech-
nology setting where researchers are often explicitly and 
intentionally engaged in knowledge production processes 
around the energy system, often to inform the policy debate 
surrounding energy, as in the case of all three S&T visions 
contained within the corpus. However, other actors also pro-
duce knowledge with the intention of informing debate or 
influencing actors, such as the ZCB report which is intended 
to prove the feasibility of a zero-carbon system by 2030. 
Similarly, the ENSG vision is an appraisal of the techni-
cal challenges of a more electric, more renewable system 
and how this might be achieved. Different appraisals also 
apply different forms of valuation to the visions. For exam-
ple, none of the civil society visions consider the economic 
costs of their own particular proposals, whereas economic 
factors often feature as a primary concern in many of the 
other documents.
Across the corpus as a whole, the largest category of 
knowledge input to the vision articulation process is ‘pro-
fessional’ which encompasses a range of different forms 
of knowledge including the tacit, experiential learning, 
and professional non-academic forms of expertise. Mod-
elling and statistical analyses also feature as recurrent 
forms of knowledge input and output. Reviewing across 
the knowledge inputs and outputs in this way also reveals 
some of the interconnections between different forms of 
energy knowledge. For example, the fact that models, such 
as MARKAL, have played a big role in energy knowledge 
production in the UK (Taylor et al. 2014) is reflected in the 
fact that this model featured within two of the three aca-
demic visions (UKERC and TP) and the UK government 
are long-term users of MARKAL, which is designed to 
provide least-cost optimisation across a range of different 
technologies. In contrast, in the civil society setting, the 
TEDAP drew on the ZCB report within its own vision. 
Another example would be the way that the ENSG report 
draws on a set of National Grid scenarios. Energy visions 
tend to be built on previous forms of knowledge and ways 
of knowing and, therefore, can be shaped by the ways in 
which these antecedents were produced. Perhaps, for this 
reason, public forms of knowledge are much less prevalent 
as inputs to the articulation of the 12 visions analysed in 
this paper, as is social science—with an important excep-
tion being the DEST study. Until fairly recently, these have 
generally not been the prevalent ways of ‘knowing’ the 
energy system.
Table 6  Knowledge inputs and 
outputs in the corpus of energy 
visions
UKTP ENSG NSV WEF CBI EDF UKERC TP DEST ZCB QPSW EDAP
KNOWLEDGE INPUTS ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Social science / humanities ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Professional knowledge ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Public knowledge ݲ ݲ
KNOWLEDGE OUTPUTS ݲ ݲ
Social science / humanities ݲ ݲ ݲ
Professional knowledge ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ ݲ
Public knowledge ݲ
Quantitative modelling
Quantitative modelling
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Patterns of commonality and difference
This section has highlighted some of the key patterns of 
presence and absence across the corpus of 12 energy tran-
sition visions. Four core commonalities can be discerned 
which, perhaps, represent the shared elements of a broader 
energy transition vision. First, to a greater or lesser extent, 
all of the energy visions contain the implicit assumption that 
it is possible to manage an energy transition through possi-
ble interventions in different points in the system. However, 
the modes and methods of intervention are multiple, with 
a large degree of divergence over many of the points and 
processes of intervention. How the transition should be man-
aged is very much open to question. Second, climate change 
is the one issue that is shared by all 12 visions as some-
thing that is motivating an energy transition. Beyond this, 
there is wide variation from narrower framings of the issues 
to much broader entanglements with other environmental 
and political concerns which argue that energy systems are 
inevitably entangled in political and economic issues. Third, 
all the visions propose some kind of shift towards a more 
renewable-based energy system. Where they vary is on the 
exact configuration of renewable technologies, and the role 
for other energy sources including fossil fuels, nuclear, and 
CCS. Finally, nearly all visions contain some kind of pro-
posal for the management of carbon. Where they vary is 
in the exact way this should be managed, through market 
mechanisms (e.g. EUETS), taxes, or rationing approaches 
such as TEQs.
Some more significant points of divergence can also be 
identified across the corpus. First, there is a stark difference 
between the model of future societal progress contained 
within the visions, which are based either on the continua-
tion of, or rejection of economic growth. Second, there are 
varying degrees of attention to the distributional costs and 
benefits of the transition. In some cases, there is recognition 
of issues pertaining to justice and equity, such as the role 
of energy in armed conflict and questions of intergenera-
tional equity, whereas such concerns are absent from others. 
Finally, there is a distinction between more centralised and 
more distributed configurations, in relation to the techno-
logical preferences, the governance arrangements, and the 
forms of relevant knowledge. In the next section, we draw 
out some broader interpretive themes emerging from the 
analysis.
Co‑producing sociotechnical imaginaries
The co‑production(s) of energy transition visions
The analysis undertaken in section four provides some 
important insights into the co-productive dimensions of 
energy transition visions and their relationship to broader 
sociotechnical imaginaries. Reading across the corpus of 
visions provides contrasting examples of the way in which 
the imagined configurations of energy technologies go hand 
in hand with particular visions of future social relations 
and forms of social order. For example, the highly renew-
able focused vision of Zero-Carbon Britain brings with it 
assumptions about reconfigurations in patterns of travel, 
leisure, and consumption (e.g. in the form of changing diets 
and agricultural practices). Similarly, the Transition Towns 
EDAP recognises the way in which energy is distributed 
and entangled in many different aspects of everyday life and 
embraces the changing nature of everyday life as a positive 
aspect of the overall transition; for example, a shift towards 
more walking and cycling, self-provisioning of food, and 
livelihoods which are embedded within an imagined local 
economy.
The work of Timothy Mitchell (2011) is illuminating 
in showing the co-productive relationship between politi-
cal orders and energy systems. Within the cases analysed, 
visions which advocate a high degree of centralised large-
scale energy technologies tend to ‘produce’ implicitly 
centralised and technocratic sociopolitical orderings. For 
example, ENSG produces a vision whereby the reconfigu-
ration of energy infrastructure is primarily a technical and 
expert led activity, where the public and other actors exist 
only to be consulted in relation to the proposals that have 
been developed. Conversely, visions of social ordering that 
seek to enhance equity and democratic control produce 
alternative technological configurations. For example, it is 
for this reason that visions, such as the QPSW vision, pro-
mote a transition to renewables because of the political and 
democratic implications. Whilst different technologies can 
produce different social orders through the ownership and 
regulatory structures with which they are implicated, there 
is still a certain degree of openness in relation to the con-
figurations of governance instruments that exist in relation 
to a given technology. This can be seen in multiple different 
mechanisms in which solar technologies can be deployed 
from community-based ownership to corporate investment 
models (cf. Hess 2013).
The exploration of the issues that motivate energy tran-
sition visions suggests that that low-carbon energy transi-
tions are not narrow single-issue controversies, but should 
be understood as broader political situations (Barry 2012) 
where there is an interlinkage of multiple issues. The sig-
nificance which different actors attribute to different issues 
and the associated risks inevitably shapes their vision; for 
example, the risks of climate change or nuclear energy. 
These assessments, therefore, underpin particular logics 
and rationales that then shape particular technological and 
governance proposals that are then developed. For example, 
the deeper problematisation of fossil fuels found within the 
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civil society visions leads to a more comprehensive rejection 
as part of the technological ‘solution’ to the energy crisis. 
Likewise, a concern with the implications of broader issues 
like justice and equity inform different forms of intervention 
in the system, such as the rationing of carbon, rather than 
its allocation through forms of market mechanisms. Indeed, 
the prevalence of the latter is also an evidence of the way in 
which energy and economic systems are deeply entangled, 
e.g., through the way in which neoliberal governance logics 
have shaped the energy system.
Situatedness of energy visions
A second important theme when interpreting the multiple 
visions analysed is that they illustrate the way in which all 
visions of low-carbon transitions are situated and partial. 
The sociomaterial ‘setting’ in which different visions are 
produced is at least partly relevant in shaping the particu-
lar vision that emerges, but so are the wider entanglements 
with extant orders and arrangements. Whilst we have to be 
cautious about drawing too many conclusions from this rel-
atively small sample, Table 7 highlights some differences 
between more dominant sociotechnical imaginaries that are 
produced in the state setting, and alternative imaginaries that 
are primarily articulated through the civil society visions.
Whilst there is some difference between the perspec-
tives co-produced in each setting, to some extent all of the 
visions are shaped by the existing ‘constitutional’ arrange-
ments (see Jasanoff 2011) insofar that they contain aspects 
of the currently dominant ways of knowing, doing and 
organising energy, along with the meanings and frames 
associated with them. As a general rule, one might expect 
the visions that are positioned closer to the centres of 
power and calculation in the UK energy system to more 
recognisably reproduce the dominant sociotechnical imag-
inaries associated with energy transition. Therefore, we 
see the Low-Carbon Transition Plan offers a technologi-
cal fix (dependent on Carbon Capture and Storage), based 
on a narrower set of issues (the ‘trilemma’), organised 
using market-based mechanisms with the wider objec-
tive of using the trilemma to support economic growth. 
In contrast, as a general rule, those visions that are more 
‘decentred’ (Irwin and Horst 2016)—located further from 
the relational ‘centre’ of the system, such as some of those 
from civil society—often tend to be less structured by the 
extant constitutional arrangements. However, it should 
also be noted that this is not necessarily always the case 
in every dimension. A good example is the Zero-Carbon 
Britain’s vision of a transition to 100% renewable energy, 
which—whilst being a somewhat radical vision of rapid 
decarbonisation—draws heavily on modelling and techni-
cal data. In this sense, it has been shaped by the dominant 
epistemologies that shape energy scenario work in the UK, 
which tend to focus around quantitative modelling and the 
technical performance of technologies. By adopting the 
dominant conventions of energy knowledge production, 
the ZCB report is, therefore, seeking to gain power and 
Table 7  Shared elements of 
energy visions Shared elements of visions
State Energy security as an issue
Focus on infrastructure
Focus on cost / economics of transition
Business Transition needed for economic growth
Affordability as an issue
Governance through economic intervention (especially the ‘market’) rather
than regulation)
Fossil fuels and nuclear as part of the energy mix
Science and
Technology
Fairly narrow framing of the issue around the energy trilemma
Mixed energy system proposed
Broad range of governance instruments proposed
Support for economic growth implicit - neither advocated or opposed
Produce explicit knowledge in order to inform decision making
Civil
society
Broader range of issues motivating energy vision, e.g. procedural and
distributive justice
Negative framing of fossil fuels
Focus on regulation and the rationing of carbon emissions
Transition as process towards ‘steady state’ economy
Funding / cost of transition not a concern
Interest in alternative metrics and measurements of progress
986 Sustainability Science (2019) 14:973–990
1 3
establish certain forms of credibility within the wider 
debate around the future of the energy transition.
Like the CAT report, the Transition Town Totnes 
Energy Descent Action Plan articulates a sociotechni-
cal imaginary which varies from the dominant ‘centred’ 
one: one which proposes sociocultural change instead of 
techno-fix, opens up a broader set of issues including peak 
oil, equity, and broader sustainability issues, is organised 
around voluntaristic and rationing-based systems, and 
argues that the transition is required to shift society away 
from an unsustainable capitalist development.
Reflecting on the ways in which different energy visions 
are situated draws attention to how such settings influ-
ence the production of ‘Science and Technology’ (S&T) 
visions, and, indeed, their relations to other visions that 
are produced. One clear pattern that emerges from the 
data is that S&T visions tend to much closer dominant 
imaginaries than the peripheral or alternatives ones. A 
certain degree of similarity between the S&T visions and 
the state visions can be observed. For example, in rela-
tion to the categories in Table 8, the S&T-related visions 
tend to replicate the dominant sociotechnical imaginary 
of an energy transition, rather than those that represent 
an alternative perspective. This is significant, because it 
might be considered that academia has a certain degree of 
intellectual freedom. However, the way in which research 
is entangled within the wider energy assemblage, through 
networks of financial capital and conventions of credibil-
ity, acts to shape the types of knowledge that are produced 
(Evans 2005). Kevin Anderson (2015) has recently drawn 
attention to this form of co-production in relation to cli-
mate scenarios where, he argues, political pressure leads 
the scientists to underplay the significance of their sci-
ence and rely on unproven negative emission technolo-
gies (such as Carbon Capture and Storage) to make their 
messages politically palatable. Notably, many of the S&T 
visions are also dependent on CCS to meet their projected 
carbon targets. Other visions are less structured by domi-
nant sociotechnical imaginaries. The association between 
less structured space and more radical forms of innova-
tion is a core element of niche innovation theory (Smith 
and Raven 2012). In sociocultural terms, this often means 
that radical innovation is associated with countercultural 
sites, spaces, and networks (Longhurst 2015); for example, 
the vision of the Dark Mountain (2010) social movement, 
which explicitly rejects the modernist techno-utopianism 
of ‘mainstream’ visions (Graugaard 2014). It is, therefore, 
in such sites and spaces where novel ideas and (social) 
innovations are, perhaps, more likely to emerge.
Constructions of energy publics
Turning to constructions of publics, it is also evident that 
there is a great deal of divergence in how the roles of pub-
lics and wider society in energy transitions are imagined. 
Across the 12 visions included in our analysis, four distinct 
imaginaries of publics and their roles in energy transitions 
were evident:
• Passive consumers Publics are imagined primarily in a 
passive role as consumers at the back end of the energy 
supply system.
• Protected publics Publics are imagined as in need of pro-
tection and support either as motivation for the transition 
or through it.
• Consulted citizens Institutions realise that there is a pub-
lic that needs to be consulted and create the opportunities 
to do so.
• Active publics Publics are imagined as active agents who 
can contribute to, or resist, the transition.
Table 9 shows how these distinct conceptions of the pub-
lic relate to the different settings in which the visions of 
energy transitions were produced.
Some basic patterning of the different constructions 
across the four settings can be observed. First, it is clear 
that the civil society visions tend to produce a positive view 
of the role of publics within the energy transition. These 
Table 8  Contrasting dominant and alternative sociotechnical imaginaries of the energy transition
Element Dominant imaginaries Alternative imaginaries
Overall trajectory ‘Techno-fix’ - technologies such as CCS
mean that ‘normal’ life can continue
without much adjustment
‘Power down’: life with less energy means
shifts in cultural and social organization.
Issues pertaining to the Energy
Transition
Narrowly framed around the Trilemma of
climate change, energy costs, and
security.
Energy transition motivated by a broader set
of ethical, equity-related and environmental
issues
Underlying organizational logic Market mechanisms Voluntaristic and rationing based
Relation to economic trajectory An energy transition is needed to support
jobs, wealth creation and economic
development
An energy transition is needed to shift
towards a ‘degrowth economy.
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visions tend to envisage that the public can show a leader-
ship role, as well as practically engage in the transition in a 
number of different ways; for example, as energy producers 
(prosumers) or as participants and supporters of community 
energy projects. A consistent theme of the alternative socio-
technical imaginaries of an energy transition is, therefore, 
an envisaged relationship between a decentralised energy 
system and increased and more diverse instances of public 
engagement in the energy system. As such, these optimistic 
perspectives do not imagine that the public might, in some 
way, resist or object to the energy transition. In contrast, the 
S&T located visions tend to recognise both positive and neg-
ative roles for the public: positive in the sense of consumers 
who engage with smart devices to assist with demand man-
agement and reduction, but negative in terms of the potential 
for resistance to specific technologies such as the localised 
controversies that can arise around onshore wind projects. In 
the latter case, an ‘active’ public is active in its resistance to 
certain visions of the energy transition (Walker et al. 2007). 
The state situated visions do not demonstrate a strong pat-
terning to their imaginaries of the public. They are present, 
but generally in fairly narrow ways, depending on the par-
ticular origins of the vision. Similarly, the business setting 
visions are also narrow in their conception of publics, mostly 
constructing them as passive energy consumers rather than 
more active participants in the system.
Future(s) implications
Sociotechnical visions and imaginaries of alternative pos-
sible futures play powerful roles in shaping decisions and 
commitments in the present. In this paper, we have delib-
erately sought to open up to diversities that exist around 
completing the visions of an energy transition, with par-
ticular reference to the UK. Our relational co-productionist 
approach has provided a view into how multiple actor col-
lectives across energy systems co-produce different visions 
of what an energy transition might entail and, in many cases, 
work actively to shape the system according to these visions. 
Placing these visions alongside each other and exploring 
them comparatively have allowed us to demonstrate the 
importance of taking energy visions as objects of study, the 
significance of the collective practices and settings in which 
futures get made, and the ways in which visions of energy 
transitions could be produced otherwise.
Importantly, our analysis has shown how situated visions 
relate to wider collectively held sociotechnical imaginar-
ies associated with low-carbon energy transitions. In these 
respects, the paper has made three important contributions 
to the studies of future-making.
First, through building on relational co-production-
ist scholarship in STS, we have set out a new analytical 
framework for mapping the dimensions of sociotechnical 
visions, which emphasises the co-production of meanings 
(issues), knowings (cognition), doings (material commit-
ments), and organisings (governance arrangements). While 
these dimensions have at times animated previous studies 
Table 9  Constructions of the 
public in energy visions
Passive - consumer Protected - Publics Consulted - citizens Active - publics
UKTP ݲ ݲ + / -
NSV
ENSG ݲ
WEF ݲ ݲ -
EDF ݲ
CBI ݲ
TP ݲ + / -
UKERC ݲ -
DEST -
ZCB +
EDAP +
QPSW ݲ +
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of the co-production of technoscience and social order, our 
framework has allowed a comparative analysis and visual 
representation of the inclusion and exclusion of elements 
on each of these dimensions that make up energy visions. 
Our analysis has shown all four dimensions and elements 
therein, to be evident in the UK energy visions of varying 
forms. Importantly, our analysis has shown that in all 12 
visions considered in our corpus—whether they are more 
descriptive or normative, open or closed, quantitative or 
qualitative, analytical or discursive, and so on—these four 
dimensions are always co-produced. The technical, material, 
and cognitive aspects of future energy visions are inherently 
intertwined with social, normative, and political orders. This 
suggests that all energy visions are political, even where they 
are constructed and presented in a technocratic or scientific 
way, and the future evolution of energy systems, is deeply 
political (Meadowcroft 2009; Mitchell 2011). Furthermore, 
our analysis reveals that all sociotechnical visions are com-
paratively partial, each containing exclusions and inclusions 
in relation to each other. We suggest that our approach to 
mapping and visualising diverse visions could be produc-
tively used in future research to sensitise those involved 
co-producing sociotechnical visions to the partialities and 
exclusions of their own visions, to consider alternative pos-
sible imaginaries, and to anticipate possible future tensions 
and points of controversy (for example, over alternative 
models of economic development and progress, more cen-
tralised or distributed modes of governing, and so on).
Second, our analysis has shown that the make-up of soci-
omaterial collective practices through which sociotechnical 
visions get made (including the actors which are included 
and excluded from their production), as well as the institu-
tional, discursive, epistemic, and material settings in which 
they are co-produced, fundamentally matters to the imag-
ined futures that are produced, circulate and express agency 
in the world. A crucial finding of our study is how visions 
co-produced within institutional settings of the state, busi-
ness, and academic research while expressing divergences 
between themselves, often exhibited significant differences 
compared to visions in our analysis which originated from 
civil society settings. Sociotechnical visions orchestrated by 
state, business, and academic research settings were more 
closely associated with the dominant sociotechnical imagi-
nary of the UK energy transition identified in our analysis, 
which emphasised large-scale technological change, nar-
rowly defined issues of the energy trilemma (climate change, 
cost, and energy security), and incumbent neoliberal mod-
els of economic development and progress. This is in con-
trast to visions emerging form civil society settings, which 
were more closely associated with alternative sociotechni-
cal imaginaries of UK energy transitions, varyingly plac-
ing more emphasis on social and cultural change, a broader 
set of ethical, equity-related and environmental issues, and 
alternative models of progress including the models of 
‘degrowth’. Our analysis suggests that sociotechnical visions 
produced beyond formal institutions in civil society settings 
are shown to be more diverse and create distributed spaces 
where counter-hegemonic sociotechnical imaginaries can be 
(re)produced and circulate across space and time.
Yet, whilst we found that certain ‘dominant’ collectively 
held imaginaries of the transition tend to be (re)produced in 
more formalised institutional settings, it would be erroneous 
to assume that such patterning is inevitable. Our findings 
also warn against the simplistic reification of differences 
between visions produced in formal institutional settings and 
those emerging in more informal spaces in civil society and 
beyond. Our analysis provides evidence of opening up and 
closing down (Stirling 2008) in relation to meanings, know-
ings, doings, and organisings occurring in visions emerging 
across all four settings and forms of collective practice in our 
corpus. It just so happens that visions associated with formal 
institutions of science, business, and the state in our analy-
sis were more closely relationally connected with—being 
shaped by and shaping—the dominant sociotechnical imagi-
nary of the UK energy transition associated with the cen-
tral stabilities of the UK energy system as constitution (see 
Chilvers et al. 2018) and a UK political culture with a tra-
ditional preference for high evidential standards and sound 
scientific knowledge in relation to policy making (Jasanoff 
2005). In most cases, the importance of the settings and 
collective practices through which sociotechnical visions 
are co-produced was more significant than the individual 
actors involved. Even where deliberate attempts were made 
to democratise the co-production of energy future visions, 
we see the settings and collective practices through which 
actors (e.g., various publics) are engaged playing a funda-
mental role in shaping and formatting the visions produced. 
For example, moves to open up government and scientific 
research energy visions (RTP and UKERC) to public inputs 
did not prevent the framing, conditioning, and formatting of 
these processes around imperatives of the dominant socio-
technical imaginary associated with incumbent institutions, 
where assumptions about models of economic development 
and progress were held to a large extent constant.
Finally, a further important implication of our study is 
that in both interpretive analyses of, and practical inter-
ventions in, future-making, it is fundamentally important 
to open up to the diverse settings and collective practices 
through which futures are co-produced (cf. Chilvers and 
Longhurst 2016). For example, the exclusion of diverse 
civil society settings and spaces, and associated actors, 
from (studies of) initiatives to develop visions, scenarios and 
imaginaries of energy transitions would dramatically close 
down imagined futures, foreclosing more radical, distrib-
uted, and speculative alternatives. This should be guarded 
against in future research and anticipatory practices in the 
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fields of energy, climate change, and beyond. Furthermore, 
it is important that emerging studies of sociotechnical imagi-
naries do not only focus on dominant, hegemonic, and cen-
tral imaginaries that have and continue to shape our collec-
tive futures (Jasanoff and Kim 2015), but, at the same time, 
pay due attention to the counter-hegemonic imaginaries that 
are more marginal, distributed, and decentred. This presents 
a key challenge, both to our current analysis and future stud-
ies, as such visions and imaginaries are much less readily 
codified, documented, and publicised, in future, past, and 
present. We suggest that comparative analyses employing 
frameworks such as those developed in this paper have a 
crucial role to play here, not only in comparing between 
imaginaries associated with nation states but also between 
sociotechnical imaginaries co-produced through more local-
ised and transnational spaces of future-making in sustain-
ability transitions, and the interplays between them.
In a more practical sense, opening up to diverse spaces of 
future-making implies that those who are responsible for the 
production of visions should acknowledge the partiality of 
all sociotechnical visions, explicitly recognising that exclu-
sions are inevitable and being transparent about the assump-
tions and partialities that are contained therein. This implies 
a different approach to practices of visioning around energy 
transitions, one which complements the dominant scientific 
future-making practices of modelling and prediction with 
alternative methods which map extant diversities (as we have 
attempted in this paper) and, thus, provide a more humble, 
reflexive and responsible foundation for practices of future-
making and sociotechnical transformation.
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